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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
governing actions to foreclose mortgages or enforcing a liability created by
20
statute cannot control in the presence of a specific declaration.
The Court overruled the Appellate Division's27 determination that the
above mentioned statutes of limitation affect only the remedy, not the right,
and therefore, can be applied without conflicting with the declaration of a
perpetual lien. The Court refused to go along with the somewhat artificial
"right-persists-remedy-gone" analysis which is generally used to uphold revival
legislation 2 s feeling that this analysis has no place where there is an attempt
to bar the primary means of enforcement, specifically made perpetual, relegating the lienor to inferior remedies.
It is obvious that it was intended to make these liens perpetual and an
attempt to construe the section involved as giving merely a right, leaving the
remedy controlled by general statutes of limitation, involves artificial reasoning
which has no place inour modern tax structures.

TORTS
False Arrest
The offense of speeding in a vehicle is labeled by statute a "traffic violation"
rather than a crime.' The purpose of legislating such designation was "to establish
a new type crime," without the stigma of criminality attached. 2 Yet, such offense, by
statute, is subject to similar jurisdiction accorded traditional misdemeanors.3
In the case of Squadrito v. Griebsch,4 plaintiff brought a false arrest action
against defendant state trooper, who arrested him while speeding and took him to
a justice of the peace without informing him as to why he was apprehended.
(He was duly tried, found guilty and fined for speeding). The Court of Appeals
held (4-3), his complaint should be dismissed. In so holding, the majority rea26. In County of Erie vs Lowenstein, 235 N. Y. 458, 139 N. E. 573 (1923),
a statute similar to the one involved here was held to give the liens involved
perpetual existence.
27. 1 A. D. 2d 976, 150 N. Y. S. 2d 914 (2d Dep't 1955).
28. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (1885).
1. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw §2 (29). Courts and judicial officers heretofore exercising jurisdiction over such acts and violations as misdemeanors or
otherwise shall continue to exercise jurisdiction over traffic infractions as herein
defined, and for such purpose such acts and violations shall be deemed misdemeanors and all provisions of law relating to misdemeanors . , . except as
herein otherwise expressly provided shall apply to traffic Infractions, except
however, that no jury trial shall be allowed for traffic infractions.
2. PUBLIC PAPERS OF Gov. HERBERT LEHMAN, 345 (1934).

3.
4.

See note 1, supra.

1 N. Y. 2d. 471, 136 N. E. 2d. 504 (1956).

COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
soned that the plaintiff's offense fell, within sections 177 and 180 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure,5 rendering him liable to arrest without a warrant
and notice then as to his offense.
Judge Desmond, dissenting, argued that the policeman should have stated
the reason for arrest to the plaintiff, since section 180 can apply only to ".... grave
crimes . . . or public disorders or breaches of the peace where there can be no

uncertainty as to the cause." He deemed the plaintiff's offense clearly outside
such category. Arguing alternatively, he said that though classed as crimes for
jurisdiction purposes, traffic offenses are not susceptible to being termed crimes in
this context. Accordingly, the defendant still was not protected by section 180
and was therefore required to tell the plaintiff the nature of his offense when he
arrested him.
It would seem that logical statutory arguments can be framed for either side
in this case. For this reason, policy considerations must be weighed. As conceded
by the majority, it would have been reasonably simple for the officer to inform
the plaintiff why he was taking him into custody. Indeed, the majority recommended this be done in such cases as a matter of administrative practise. The
dissent pointed out the minimal burden such requirement would place on law
officers, as contrasted to the "valuable and important right" one ordinarily has
to be told why he is arrested. Further, speeding can hardly be classified a "public
disorder" or "peace breach"-where one's very act apprises him of his offenseregardless of the danger it may cause. For this reason and the small effort involved
in telling a traffic transgressor of his offense when arrested, the duty to inform
should be made mandatory with police officers.
Testamentary Libel
The rule that allegedly libelous matter is defamatory per se, "... if it tends
to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce
an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking people, and . . . deprive
him of their friendly intercourse .... ,, was applied by the Court of Appeals in

Brown v. DuFrey.7
5. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §177. A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person, (1.) For a crime, committed or attempted in his presence; N. Y.
CODE CRI. PROC. §180. [An officer] must state his authority and cause of arrest,
except where party is committing felony or is pursued after escape. When
arresting a person without a warrant the officer must inform him of the authority
of the officer and the cause of arrest, except when the. person is arrested in the
actual commission of a crime, or is pursued immediately after escape. (emphasis
added).
6. Mencher v. Ches7ey, 297 N. Y. 94, 75 N. E. 2d 257 (1947); Nichols v. Item
Publishers,309 N. Y. 596, 132 N. E. 2d 860 (1956), 6 BUFFALO L. REv. 72 (1956).
7. 1 N. Y. 2d 190, 134 N. E. 2d 469 (1956).

